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ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUNGARD'S
MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
AND DENYING PLAINTIFF DISCOVERY

Plaintiff Giusti contends the district court erred in granting SunGard's motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by failing to follow the procedural guidelines
announced in Anderson v. American Society of Plastic Surgeons, 807 P.2d 825, 827
(Utah 1990), by either (1) failing to consider the evidence Plaintiff presented as a prima
facie showing of general and specific jurisdiction over SunGard, (2) resolving the parties5
conflicting evidence against Plaintiff, and/or (3) requiring Plaintiff to make more than a
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction.1
SunGard does not directly respond to these arguments, but immediately diverts to
a discussion of the legal standard for determining whether a non-resident parent
corporation is transacting business through its subsidiary and citing numerous decisions
SunGard contends the district court "undisputedly" applied in dismissing SunGard for
lack of personal jurisdiction. (Def. Br. 11-14) This argument, however, fails to
acknowledge that whatever substantive law the district court applied in dismissing
SunGard, it was nonetheless constrained to apply such law in accordance with the
procedural guidelines prescribed in Anderson. Also, contrary to SunGard's argument, the
district court's order does not articulate or discuss the legal standard or the case law cited

1

See, Facts,ffif1-9, 13-15, 20, 25-27, 30-32, 38, 40-41 (PI. Br. 10-24) and Argument
(PL Br. 29-34).

1

by SunGard, which includes only decisions denying personal jurisdiction over a nonresident parent corporation.2 See, Order, March 30, 2002, PI. Br. Add. 2.

2

For example, in Litster v. Aha Corp., 2006 WL 3327906 (D. Utah 2006) (Def. Br.
11), the plaintiff did not present an affidavit to controvert the defendant's affidavit that it
did not transact business in Utah. Id. at *2. In Sammons Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 205 Cal. App.3d 1427 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (Def. Br. 12), the plaintiff was unable
to controvert the defendant's showing that it lacked minimum contacts or necessary
control of its subsidiary. Id. at 1430-31. In LaSalle National Bank v. Vitro, Sociedad
Anonima, 85 F. Supp. 2d 857 (N.D. 111. 2000) (Def. Br. 13), the parent corporation's only
contact with the forum was a "passive" Internet website. Id. at 861.
By contrast, Plaintiff Giusti submitted Affidavits and other sworn evidence
controverting the allegations in the Bronstein Affidavit submitted by SunGard, which
alleged that SunGard did not transact business in Utah; had no "minimum contacts" with
Utah; exercised no control over SWC, Hyde or Erickson; that Hyde was not an employee
or officer of SunGard, and that SunGard was not involved in the hiring or termination of
Plaintiffs employment in Utah, giving rise to Plaintiffs claims. See, Giusti Aff. ^fl|17,
38-39, 41, 53, 57(A-H), 58(A-H), 59(A-F), 60-62, PI. Br. Add. 17, R.274, 280-281, 284291; R.268-339; See also, Giusti Supp. Aff. ^[19, PL Br. Add. 18, R.585; ffljl-9,13-14, 20,
25-27, 31-32, 37-38, 40-41, PI. Br.10-24.
In the 1965 Fisher Baking case, 238 F. Supp. 322, 325, Tfl 1 (D. Utah 1965), on which
SunGard heavily relies (Def. Br. 12-15), the Utah federal district court found that
"corporate separation was scrupulously observed" and that the non-resident corporation
"did not control the day to day operations or activities of its subsidiary." Conversely,
Plaintiff Giusti presented substantial evidence showing that SunGard disregarded
corporate formalities and exercised substantial direct and indirect influence and control
over SWC through its non-resident officers and its resident agents, officers or employees,
Hyde and Erickson. See, ffi[l-9,l 1,12-14, 20, 22-27, 31-32, 38, 40-41, PL Br.10-24; See
also, Giusti Aff. ffl[ 5-6, 9,16-17, 20, 57(A-H), 58(A-H), 59(A-F), 60-62, PL Br. Add. 17,
R. 270-292; Giusti Supp. Aff. ^19, PL Br. Add. 18, R.581-585. It should also be noted
that Fisher Baking was decided four years before the Utah legislature enacted U.C.A.
§78-27-3(2), (1969), defining the "transaction of business" in Utah to include "the
activities of a non-resident person, his agents or representatives...." (Emphasis supplied)
(PL Br. Add. 1); See also, Phone Directories v. Contel Corp., 786 F. Supp. 930 (D. Utah
1992), adopting the "significant influence" test in preference to earlier "daily operations"
test utilized in Fisher Baking based on a finding that "the day-to-day control test is
inconsistent with contemporary economic realities." Id. at 939.

2

SunGard next argues that the district court correctly granted its motion to dismiss
based on the purported "undisputed facts" in the Bronstein Affidavit submitted by
SunGard, which SunGard further characterizes as demonstrating "that SunGard and SWC
had a normal parent/subsidiary relationship." (Def. Br. 13-14) Although SunGard claims
Plaintiff Giusti "fails to put forth any specific dispute of material facts, to show how or
what evidence was weighed against him" (Def. Br. 15), this argument is incorrect.
Conversely, Plaintiff presented evidence in his Verified First Amended Complaint, sworn
Affidavits and other documentary evidence disputing the Bronstein allegations, making a
prima facie showing of general and personal jurisdiction, and demonstrating that
genuinely disputed issues of material fact remained for trial on the issues of (1) whether
SunGard transacted business in Utah; (2) whether SunGard had "minimum contacts" with
Utah; (3) whether SunGard exercised significant influence or control over SWC, Hyde
and Erickson in Utah; (4) whether Hyde was a SunGard employee, officer or agent, and
(5) whether SunGard was involved in conduct in Utah giving rise to Plaintiffs claims.3
Plaintiff argued that the district court erred by either failing to consider Plaintiffs

Some of the cases cited by SunGard expressly reject the "minimum contacts" analysis
utilized for determining personal jurisdiction over a non-resident parent corporation in
Utah and many other jurisdictions. See, IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co.,
136 F.3d 537, 540 (7th Cir. 1998) (Def. Br. 12), (utilizing "pierce the corporate veil"
analysis); Savin Corp. v. Heritage Copy Prod., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 463 (M.D. Pa. 1987)
(cited Def. Br. 12), (following the 1925 Cannon requirement that non-resident parent
must exercise "complete control" over local subsidiary and rejecting "minimum contacts"
analysis. Id. at 467)
3

See, Argument, R.210-220, citing Giusti Aff. f p 7 , 38-39, 41, 53, 57(A-H), 58(A-H),
59(A-F), 60-62, PI. Br. Add. 17, R.274, 280-281, 284-291, R.268-339, and Giusti Supp.
Aff. \\% PL Br. Add. 18, R.581-585.
3

evidence, or by weighing the parties' conflicting evidence and improperly resolving the
evidence against Plaintiff Giusti, in violation of this Court's direction that "any disputes
in the documentary evidence are [to be] resolved in the plaintiffs favor [and] [t]he trial
court must not weigh the evidence unless [an evidentiary] hearing is held." Anderson, at
827. (PL Br. 29-34)
SunGard next argues that the lower court correctly found that "accepting the
allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint as true, those allegations are legally insufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction over SunGard" because in SunGard's view these
allegations were "conclusory." (Def. Br. 14-15) However, the district court's Order
dismissing SunGard fails to articulate the reason the district court considered these
allegations "legally insufficient." (PI. Br. Add. 2, R.597-98)
Under Anderson, "the plaintiffs allegations are accepted as true unless specifically
controverted by the defendant's affidavits or depositions." Id. Thus, the district court was
obliged to conclude that the well-pleaded allegations of Plaintiff s Complaint on which
Plaintiff relied to show general and specific personal jurisdiction over SunGard were
legally sufficient for this purpose, unless the court affirmatively found these allegations
were directly controverted by SunGard's affidavits or depositions, and that all of the
parties' conflicting evidence, construed in Plaintiff Giusti's favor, was still insufficient to
make a prima facie showing of general or specific personal jurisdiction. Nothing in the
district court's Order dismissing SunGard indicates that it followed this procedure.
Additionally, the district court's order dismissing SunGard refers only to the
"factual allegations contained in Plaintiffs First Amended Complaint" and provides no
4

indication that the district court considered the evidence in the sworn affidavits and
documentary evidence Plaintiff submitted to make a prima facie showing of general and
specific personal jurisdiction over SunGard. See, Order, PL Br. Add. 2, R. 597-598.
Because Anderson requires the district court to consider the parties' documentary
evidence when no evidentiary hearing is held, the district court could only have made the
finding in ^3 of its Order, Id. R.597-598, by either failing to consider Plaintiffs evidence,
or by improperly weighing and resolving the parties' conflicting evidence on these issues
against Plaintiff Giusti. See, Argument, PL Br. 29-34.4
SunGard also fails to address Plaintiff Giusti's arguments that the district court's
additional findings that (1) SunGard did not engage in any acts enumerated under the
Utah long arm statute, and that (2) SunGard lacked sufficient minimum contacts with the
State of Utah to satisfy due process for purposes of general and specific personal
jurisdiction in ^ff 1-2 of its Order, PL Br. Add. 2, R.597, are likewise procedurally
incorrect, because Plaintiff Giusti presented sworn evidence sufficient to make a prima
facie showing that SunGard engaged in acts enumerated under the Utah long arm statute
(PL Br. Add. 1), including: (1) the ongoing and continuous transaction of business in
Utah; (2) the sale of services and products in Utah, (3) the ownership or use of real estate
in Utah, and (4) the tortious injury to Plaintiff Giusti in Utah, directly and though

4

Plaintiff does not complain that "the lower court considered matters outside the
pleadings," as SunGard asserts. (Def. Br. 14-15) Instead, Plaintiff complains that the
district court erred by either failing to consider the evidence outside the pleadings
submitted on the motion as implied in ][3 of the Order dismissing SunGard (PL Br. Add.
2, R.597-98) or by improperly weighing and resolving the parties' conflicting evidence
on the jurisdictional issues against Plaintiff. (PL Br. 29-34)
5

SunGard's agents, SWC, Hyde5 and Erickson6, causing Plaintiff Giusti to incur
economic, reputational and emotional damage in Utah, out of which Plaintiffs claims
against SunGard in Counts I-IV arise. See, Complaint,fflf67-70(alleging damages) (PL
Br. Add. 16, R.79-80). Plaintiff Giusti argued that the foregoing "minimum contacts" of
SunGard were sufficient to satisfy due process in the event the district court exercised
jurisdiction. (R.566-68) Thus, the district court could have only made the additional
findings in ]fl[ 1 and 2 of its Order dismissing SunGard, by either failing to consider
Plaintiffs sworn evidence or by improperly resolving the parties' conflicting evidence on
these issues against Plaintiff Giusti, or by requiring Plaintiff to make more than a "light"
prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction, thereby depriving Plaintiff of the right to
prove the district court's general and special jurisdiction over SunGard at trial.

Although the parties' evidence conflicts, Plaintiff Giusti presented sworn evidence
showing that Hyde was SunGard's employee, agent or representative in Utah, within the
meaning of U.C.A., §78-27-3(2), (1969), (PL Br. Add. 1), including evidence that
SunGard, not SWC's board, selected Hyde to be President of SWC and determined his
compensation; SunGard Vice President Greifeld created the SunGard CRM Group and
promoted Hyde to be its CEO and manage the three SunGard companies in this group,
including SWC in Utah; Hyde reported to SunGard Vice President Greifeld; Hyde made
fraudulent representations and omissions to induce Plaintiffs employment at SWC on
behalf of SunGard; Hyde negotiated transactions for SunGard in Utah, including the
acquisition of Frontier Analytics; SunGard paid Hyde's travel expenses, and SunGard
officials approved the basis for Hyde's (and Erickson's) termination of Plaintiff s
employment at SWC. Compare, Giusti Aff. ^3,5-13,15-17,19-56,57(C)(D)(E)(G), 58(BC), 59(C-F),60-62, PL Br. Add. 17, R.268-339, with Bronstein Aff. ffi[9-l 1, PL Br. Add.
20, R190-92.
6

In their motion to dismiss Plaintiffs contract claims in the district court, Hyde and
Erickson argued they could not be sued as parties to the contract based on Plaintiffs
allegations they were acting as agents of SunGard and SWC, which they did not deny.
(R.131-133)

6

Additionally, no legal authority supports SunGard's argument or the district
court's decision that Plaintiff was required to prove facts regarding SunGard's
relationship with SWC sufficient to "justify piercing the corporate veil." (Def. Br. 14;
Order, ^3, PL Br. Add. 2, R. 597-598) Where matters outside the pleadings were
considered and an evidentiary hearing was not held, Plaintiffs burden was only to make
a "light" prima facie showing of general or specific personal jurisdiction to defeat
SunGard's motion to dismiss. (PL Br. 29-30). The Utah legislature has decreed that the
Utah long arm statute is to be construed as expansively as the limits of due process under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution allow. Anderson at 826-827,
citing U.C.A., §78-27-22 (1987). Thus, this Court has never held that a plaintiff must
demonstrate evidence of a non-resident parent's control of a resident subsidiary with facts
o

sufficient to "justify piercing the corporate veil" to defeat a rule 12(b)(2) motion.

The district court also failed to consider Plaintiffs argument that a pretrial dismissal
of SunGard was improper where the merits of the jurisdictional issues are intertwined
with the merits of his claims. See, R.220; R.4477 at 44:1-8. Plaintiffs sworn evidence
shows that SunGard was involved with the fraudulent inducement and termination of his
employment, which caused Plaintiff economic, reputational and emotional injury and
damages in Utah. This evidence is sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific
personal jurisdiction over SunGard. See, Giusti Aff. 1HJ5-6, 9,10(L),17, PL Br. Add. 17,
R.269-270,272,274; See also, Anderson, supra, at 827 ("Whether defendants caused
injury to Anderson is the central question on the merits of her claims. She is entitled to
have a jury answer that question if she produces sufficient evidence.")
Q

Other states with expansive long arm statutes have also declined to impose such an
unnecessary limitation and instead consider any evidence the plaintiff presents regarding
the identity of interests of a foreign parent and its resident subsidiary in determining
whether the parent has sufficient "minimum contacts" to support the assertion of general
or specific personal jurisdiction. See, Alto Eldorado Partnership v. Amrep, 124 P.3d 585,
593-95 (N.M. App. 2005). See also, Meredith v. Healthcare Products, Inc., Ill Supp.
923 (D. Wyoming 1991) ("Because the jurisdictional question [under International Shoe]
1

Finally, SunGard argues that Plaintiff Giusti failed to "identify what discovery he
seeks or how it would be fruitful to the precise issues before the court." (Def. Br. 15-16)
Conversely, in ^63 of his Affidavit opposing SunGard's motion to dismiss, Plaintiff
requested discovery of eight specific items and explained that this discovery would assist
him in proving general and specific personal jurisdiction over SunGard. (Giusti Aff. ^63,
PI. Br. Add. 17, R.292) Given the district court's finding that Plaintiff Giusti failed to
make a sufficient showing of personal jurisdiction over SunGard, and the parties'
conflicting evidence on the jurisdictional issues, the district court's denial of Plaintiff s
specific requests for discovery was prejudicial and must be reversed.9 THAgr. &

requires the balancing of many factors, the formal separation of corporate identities does
not alone raise a bar to the court exercising jurisdiction." Id. at 926.
9

More than a year after the denial of Plaintiff s discovery motion, the dismissal of
SunGard and the denial of Plaintiff s interlocutory appeal, the district court issued an
order compelling SWC, Hyde and Erickson, now additionally represented by former
SunGard counsel, Mr. Shtasel, (R.799-801), to file supplemental answers to
interrogatories. (R.2147-2151). On August 17, 2003, Defendants filed supplemental
answers and documents (R.2227-29), including "personnel policies ...for which Plaintiff
was eligible," to wit: the SunGard "Corporate Policies" Bates stamped 11598-11609.
(PL Add. 21). These policies are Exhibit 1 to the deposition of Patricia ("Pat") Black,
published by order of the district court on June 30, 2005. (R.4477, 60, 104:17-105:3)
The SunGard "Conflict of Interest" policy defines "Company" to mean "SunGard Data
Systems, Inc., a Delaware corporation (referred to as SunGard), and all subsidiaries that
are more-than-50% owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by SunGard." This policy
also defines "Employee" to mean "any employee of the Company including all officers
and including all directors who are also employees of the Company" and defines
"Management employee" to mean "any officer, or any employee of any subsidiary, or
any other management level employee of any subsidiary of SunGard" (Emphasis
supplied) Ms. Black testified that she informed SWC employees they were bound by
these policies, and that following the merger of SunGard and SWC, she and other SWC
employees became SunGard employees. See, Pat Black Depo. 104:17-106:6 (PL Add. 22,
at 2-4,14) The foregoing policies definitively demonstrate that SunGard considered SWC,
its wholly owned subsidiary, to be part of SunGard, considered Plaintiff Giusti and
8

Nutrition, L.L.C. v. Ace European Group Ltd., 416 F. Supp.2d 1054, 1074 (D. Kan.
2006), citing Sizova v. Nat. Institute of Standards & Technology, 282 F.3d 1320, 1326
(10th Cir. 2002). For all the foregoing reasons, the Court should reverse the district
court's dismissal of SunGard, find that Plaintiff Giusti has made an adequate prima facie
showing of general and specific personal jurisdiction over SunGard, and direct the district
court to allow Plaintiff Giusti the discovery he requested to prove general and specific
jurisdiction over SunGard in the trial of this action.
POINT II
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S CONTRACT CLAIMS

Plaintiffs Uncontroverted Evidence Establishes That He Was To Be
Employed At SWC For A Specified Minimum Term Of 12 Months
SWC contends Plaintiff Giusti's arguments that the district court erred in granting

summary judgment against him on his contract claims (Counts II-IV) are all based "on
the incorrect underlying legal conclusion that Plaintiff had a November 7, 1999 contract
that provided him with a minimum term of twelve months employment at SWC.5' (Def.
Br. 17-18). (Emphasis supplied) This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First, as
Plaintiff argued in the district court, his claims for breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and promissory estoppel that are unrelated to the
termination of his employment, do not depend on whether Plaintiff was an employee for a
specified term. (PL Br. 39-40; R.348-351, 515-517, 577-578) Second, the statement that

Defendants Hyde and Erickson to be management employees of SunGard, and considered
all SWC employees in Utah to be SunGard employees, directly contradicting the
allegations of the Bronstein Affidavit SunGard submitted in support of its motion to
dismiss in the district court. (PL Br. Add. 20)
9

the parties' November 7 Contract (PL Br. Add. 4, R. 83-85) provided Plaintiff Giusti with
a minimum term of 12 months employment, is not a "legal conclusion" as SWC argues,
but sworn evidence from Plaintiffs Complaint, Affidavits, deposition testimony and
other documentary evidence Plaintiff submitted in opposition to SWC's motion for
summary judgment on his contract claims in the district court.
In his Affidavits, Plaintiff Giusti presented sworn testimony that he and Hyde
negotiated and entered into an oral agreement that Plaintiff Giusti would receive a
minimum 12 month term of employment at SWC and intended this oral agreement to be
incorporated in their November 7 Contract.10 Plaintiff also presented sworn evidence,
including the admissions of Hyde and Erickson, that during the negotiations for
Plaintiffs employment, they never told Plaintiff that his employment at SWC would be
"at-will" and never informed Plaintiff that he would have to sign another employment
agreement after he started working at SWC, relinquishing his previously agreed
employment for a specified term.11 Although SWC argues that "the facts relating to the
November 7 Contract are these..." (Def. Br. 18), SWC did not submit an affidavit from
Hyde or any other evidence, to controvert Plaintiffs sworn evidence regarding his

10

See, Exh. 33, R.3430, 3473-3474 (Note: Giusti's notes of 10/30/99 interview with
Hyde are in plain text. His comments regarding the notes are in italic and underlined.)
See also, ffl7(B-C), R.3675-3676; f9(A), R.3677-78 ; Giusti Dep. 21:14-24:16, R.2943,
2944-47; ffl[5, 11,15(1), PL Br. 11-15; Giusti Aff. 1ffll9,21, R.275; Giusti Supp. Aff. ffi[918, PL Br. Add. 18, R.583-585; November 7 Contract, PL Br. Add. 4, R.83-85.
11

See, 1|12,15(1), PL Br.14-15; See also, Giusti Aff. 1ffll9,2l, R.275; Giusti Supp. Aff.
H9-18,PLBr.Add.l8, R.583-85.
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minimum 12 month term of employment at SWC.
SWC argues that Plaintiff Giusti's evidence is contrary to the district court's
interpretation of the parties' November 7 Contract. (Def. Br. 19) However, the district
court erred in deciding, as a matter of law, that the parties intended to describe only the
terms of Plaintiff s compensation in their November 7 Contract, where Plaintiff presented
uncontroverted sworn evidence that the parties agreed that Plaintiff Giusti would receive
a minimum term of 12 months of employment at SWC and intended this agreement to be
incorporated their November 7 Contract. Thus, the district court erred in granting
summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on his breach of contract claims and the Court
should reverse this decision. See, Argument, Point II, PL Br. 34-40.
SWC cites numerous cases to support the district court's incorrect conclusion that
Plaintiff Giusti was an at-will employee (Def. Br. 20-22), but none is factually similar to
the case at bar. SWC argues that "under Utah law, a promise by an employer to continue
employment for a specified period must be clear and definite," quoting Johnson v.

Because Plaintiff Giusti alleges that the parties' November 7 Contract was
fraudulently induced, parol evidence is admissible to show that Plaintiff Giusti and Hyde
negotiated and orally agreed to a 12 month minimum term of employment and intended
this agreement to be incorporated in their November 7 Contract. See, Argument, R.370506 (citing cases); Exh. 33, R.3430,3473-3474.
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SWC's contention that Plaintiff did not appeal the district court's ruling that Plaintiff
was not an employee for a specified term in the introductory summary of the issues (Def.
Br. 20, referencing PL Br. 2, ^2) is incorrect. This issue is subsumed under the issue of
whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment based on the district
court's incorrect conclusion that the SWC Agreement rendered Plaintiff an at-will
employee (rather than an employee for a specified term) and thus barred Plaintiff Giusti's
contract claims based on the termination of his employment. See, PL Br. 2, ^J2.
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Morton Thiokol, Inc., 818 P.2d 997,1002 (Utah 1991), (Def. Br. 20). However, SWC fails
to demonstrate that Plaintiff Giusti's uncontroverted sworn evidence regarding the
parties' agreement to provide Plaintiff with a minimum term of 12 months employment at
SWC and their intention to include this agreement in their November 7 Contract, fails to
meet this test.
B.

The SWC Agreement Did Not Modify Plaintiffs Specified Minimum
Term Of Employment Under The Parties' November 7 Contract
And Genuinely Disputed Issues Of Material Fact Remain For Trial
SWC argues that the SWC Agreement (PI. Br. Add. 6) allowed SWC to terminate

Plaintiff "without cause at any time," citing §6.2 of the SWC Agreement to support this
argument. (Def. Br. 18) However, SWC objects to Plaintiffs statement that §7.3 of the
SWC Agreement allowed Plaintiff Giusti to rely on Hyde's representations of
employment for a specified term contained in the parties' oral agreement as incorporated
in their November 7 Contract (PL Br. 34-35), claiming that Plaintiff never raised this
"argument" in the lower court. (Def. Br. 23-24) This argument is without merit.
In its motion to dismiss in the district court, SWC specifically quoted the entire
three sentences comprising §7.3, the last of which states: "Each party acknowledges and
agrees that he is not relying upon any representations, warranties or other statements
concerning the subject matter of this Agreement except as may be expressly set forth in
this agreement or related documents." (R.146) (Emphasis supplied) SWC argued that
§7.3 precluded Plaintiff Giusti from relying on the parties' prior and subsequent
employment contracts. (R. 150-151)
In opposition to this argument, Plaintiff Giusti presented uncontroverted sworn

12

evidence that after reading the SWC Agreement, which included §7.3, he immediately
informed Pat Black, that the provisions of the SWC Agreement allowing termination of
employment at any time, with or without cause, did not apply to his employment at SWC,
because he and Hyde had previously negotiated a different agreement, thereby
manifesting his intent to rely on the guaranteed minimum term of 12 months employment
Plaintiff testified was incorporated in the parties' November 7 Contract. See,fflf17-19, Pi.
Br. 15-17;ffi[3-l1, PL Br. Add. 18. Based on this evidence, Plaintiff argued that SWC
could not unilaterally modify the specified term of employment in the parties' November
7 Contract under §7.3 of the SWC Agreement, where SWC's intent to do so was not
effectively communicated and where Plaintiff Giusti did not agree to any such
modification and manifested his intent to rely on the terms of the parties' November 7
Contract.14 Thus, the issue of whether the language of §7.3 was effective to bar
Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract in light of Plaintiff s expressed reliance on the
parties' prior oral agreement incorporated in their November 7 Contract for a minimum
12 months employment at SWC, was squarely before the district court and thus properly
before this Court on appeal.
Moreover, Plaintiffs argument that the SWC Agreement did not modify the
parties' November 7 Contract providing Plaintiff with a minimum 12 months of
employment at SWC is correct, even without reference to the "related documents"
language contained in §7.3, and the district court erred in granting summary judgment

14

See,ffi[12,15-19, PL Br 14-17; PL Br. 34-38; R.568-576; Giusti Aff. ffi|19, 21> P L
Add. 17, R.275-76; Giusti Supp. Aff. YP-18, p l - Br. Add. 18, R.581-585.
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Br

-

against Plaintiff on his contract claims by resolving the genuinely disputed issue of
material fact of whether Plaintiff Giusti intended to modify the parties' prior agreement
that Plaintiff would have a specified minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC
under the parties' November 7 Contract by executing the SWC Agreement, against
Plaintiff Giusti.
C.

The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment On Plaintiffs
Contract Claims Where Genuinely Disputed Issues of Material Fact Remain
For Trial On The Issue Of Whether The SWC Agreement Was Fraudulently
Induced
"Defendants cannot use a contract obtained by a fraudulent misrepresentation to

contract away liability for fraudulent misrepresentation." Mike Finnan Ford, Inc. v.
Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F. Supp.2d 970, 978 (N.D. Iowa5 2001) SWC does
not dispute that Plaintiff Giusti presented uncontroverted sworn evidence that he was
fraudulently induced to execute the SWC Agreement.flfl[17-19,PL Br.15-17) Although
SWC claims that Plaintiff failed to present this evidence in the district court (Def. Br. 24),
this argument is incorrect. See, 1ffl7A-E, R.3675-3677; R.3701, 3704. Because Plaintiffs
evidence that the SWC Agreement was fraudulently induced by Hyde, Erickson and
Black was sufficient to raise a jury issue, the district court subsequently erred by
resolving this disputed issue of fact against Plaintiff Giusti and holding that the SWC
Agreement was enforceable to bar Plaintiff Giusti's breach of contract claims relating to
the termination of his employment as a matter of law.

14

D.

The District Court Improperly Granted Summary Judgment On
Plaintiffs Contract Claims That Were Unrelated To The Termination
Of His Employment
Finally, S WC argues that the district court correctly granted summary judgment on

Plaintiffs claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and promissory estoppel in Counts II-IV that were unrelated to the termination of
his employment, because Plaintiff purportedly failed to respond to SWC's argument in
the district court that "Plaintiffs contract claims not related to termination were actually
complaints that he did not receive things that were cut off by the termination." (D. Br.
26). This argument is incorrect for two reasons. First SWC made this argument only in
reference to Plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim, not all of Plaintiff s contract claims.
(R.154-57) Second, Plaintiff did respond to SWC's argument by asserting that (1)
Plaintiffs promissory estoppel claim sought damages he incurred in relying on Hyde and
Erickson's fraudulent representations (not contract damages, as SWC argued) (R.577-78,
2252-57), and that (2) Plaintiffs contract claims unrelated to the termination of his
employment were not foreclosed by the termination.15 See, ^33-35, PI. Br. 22-23;
R.578, citing Weiser v. GodbyBros., Inc., 659 N.E.2d 237, 239 (Ind. App. 1995).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the district court's decision granting summary
judgment on Plaintiffs contract claims (Counts II-IV) is incorrect and must be reversed.

SWC's argument that only two of the contract claims unrelated to the termination of
his employment listed in Plaintiffs appellate brief were listed in Plaintiffs reply
memorandum, R. 2255, (D. Br. 26), lacks substance. The list of such claims in Plaintiffs
reply brief in the district court does not purport to be exhaustive and is prefaced with the
phrase "claims, including..." See, R. 2254 (Emphasis supplied).
15

POINT III

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF'S FRAUDULENT INDUCEMENT
CLAIMS FOR HIS PURPORTED FAILURE TO SHOW DAMAGES

Plaintiff Giusti asserts that the district court erred in granting summary judgment
against him on his claims that the Defendants fraudulently induced him to leave his prior
employment to accept employment at SWC (Count I), based on Plaintiffs purported
failure to demonstrate any damages caused by Defendants' fraud. Plaintiff contends that
this incorrect decision resulted from a series of prior incorrect legal conclusions reached
by the district court, beginning with the district court's Order of May 30, 2002 (PL Br.
Add. 3, R.703-705). Plaintiff asserts that in this Order, the district court incorrectly
concluded that: (1) under the SWC Agreement, Plaintiff was an at-will employee, rather
than an employee for a specified minimum term of 12 months under the parties'
November 7 Contract; (2) Plaintiffs purported "at will" status precluded his claim for
fraudulent inducement of his employment at SWC, because §7.3 of the SWC Agreement
purportedly foreclosed Plaintiffs reliance on SWC's prior representations of employment
for a specified term;16 and that (3) Plaintiff could only assert a claim for the damages he

The district court reached this conclusion despite Plaintiffs evidence and
arguments that: (1) the SWC Agreement was fraudulently induced; (2) the SWC
Agreement did not preclude Plaintiffs reliance on the parties' prior November 7
Contract, which he testified was intended to incorporate the parties' prior oral
agreement that Plaintiff would have a minimum 12 month term of employment at
SWC; (3) the SWC Agreement did not modify Plaintiffs specified term of
employment; (4) Plaintiff expressly disavowed reliance on the termination provisions
of the SWC Agreement, and that (5) even if Plaintiff Giusti was an at-will employee,
his claim for fraudulent inducement of his employment at SWC was not barred by such
status, nor by the termination of his employment, nor by §7.3 of the fraudulently
induced SWC Agreement. (PL Br. 34-40)
16

incurred from being fraudulently induced to leave his prior employment, and could not
assert a claim for damages for being fraudulently induced to accept employment at S WC
See, Argument, PL Br. 40-42.
Proceeding on the foregoing incorrect conclusions, Plaintiff Giusti contends that
the district court additionally erred in its Order dated April 21, 2006 (PI. Hi. Add 9,
R.3922-3926), by: (1) declining to consider the substantial record evidence Plaintiff
presented to show the "benefit of the bargain" and consequential damages he incurred as
the result of the fraudulent inducement of his employment at SWC; (2) concluding
Plaintiff failed to establish any "out of pocket" damages on his fraudulent inducement
claims; (3) denying Plaintiff Giusti any "out of pocket" damages by incorrectly placing
the burden to prove that Plaintiff failed to mitigate his damages on Plaintiff Giusti rather
than the Defendants, and by (4) using an incorrect formula and Tacts to calculate Plaintiff
Giusti's "out of pocket" damages.17
Defendants do not dispute Plaintiff Giusti's assertion that he presented substantial
record evidence of the "benefit of the bargain" and consequential damages, including
damages for monies earned and not paid at SWC. (PL Br. 42-43) Instead, Defendants
argue that the district court's decision limiting Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim to
recovery of "out of pocket" damages for "being induced to relinquish his prior

17

See, Argument, PI. Br. 43-47, discussing Order, PL Br. Add. 9, R.3922-23; See also,
Argument, R.3700-3711; R.3883-3892.
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employment based upon the fraudulent misrepresentation of the Defendants"18 (Order, PL
Br. Add. 3, R.705), was proper under Ong International (U.S.A.), Inc. v. 11th Ave. Corp.,
850 P.2d 447, 457 (Utah 1993) because "in order to be recoverable, fraud damages must
be a reasonably foreseeable consequence of a defendant's acts." (Def. Br. 28). This
argument is untenable because it was just as foreseeable that Plaintiff Giusti would be
damaged by his reliance on the fraudulent representations Hyde and Erickson made to
induce Plaintiffs employment at SWC.19 Moreover, the district court had no power to
deny Plaintiff Giusti "benefit of the bargain" damages for fraudulent inducement of his
employment at SWC when this Court has declared such damages are recoverable.

To support their argument that the district court properly limited Plaintiff to "out of
pocket" damages on his fraudulent inducement claims, Defendants incorrectly describe
these claims as alleging that "he had been damaged by abandonment of earnings and
benefits from his prior employment." (Def. Br. 28). This description of Plaintiff s
fraudulent inducement claims is unsupported and contrary to the allegations of Plaintiff s
Complaint. See, ffl[15-51, PL Br. Add. 16, R.62-74. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
fraudulently induced him to leave his prior employment to accept employment at SWC,
and do not allege that he "abandoned" the earnings and benefits he received from his
prior employer, as Defendants contend. Id.
19

As in the district court, Defendants failed to counter Plaintiff Giusti's sworn
testimony and documentary evidence that he and Hyde agreed that Plaintiff would have a
guaranteed minimum term of 12 months employment at SWC and intended that this
agreement be incorporated in the parties' November 7 Contract. Plaintiff Giusti's
contemporaneous notes of his interview with Hyde on October 30, 1999, indicate that
Giusti told Hyde that he (Plaintiff) thought the language in the proposed contract
guaranteeing him a minimum of 12 months employment at SWC was "weak" and that he
wanted Hyde's personal assurance that Hyde was agreeing to a minimum 12 months of
employment in the contract language and that Hyde provided such assurances during
their interview. See, f 11, PL Br. 13 (Giusti's notes of 10/30/99 interview with Hyde, Exh.
33, R.3430, 3464, 3473-3474. Note: Plaintiffs notes of this interview are in plain text.
His comments regarding the notes are in italic and underlined); See also, ffl[7(B-C),
R.3675-3676; TJ9(A), R.3677-78, Giusti Dep. 21:14-24:16, R.2943, 2944-47.
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Prudential Oil & Minerals Company v. Hamblin, 277 F.2d 384, 387 (10th Cir. 1960)
(applying Utah law).
As in the district court, Defendants also attempt to support the district court's
conclusion that Plaintiff Giusti is not entitled to recover "benefit of the bargain" damages
for being fraudulently induced to accept employment at SWC, by citing cases with facts
different from the facts in the instant case. Defendants also cite cases such as Lokay v.
Lehigh Valley Cooperative Farmers, Inc., 492 A.2d 405, 410-411 (Pa. Super.Ct.1985),
from jurisdictions that limit an employee's recovery of damages in fraud to "out of
pocket" damages. (Def. Br. 29-30 and cases cited n.8; R.3707) Although championing
these decisions as the "mainstream view among courts elsewhere" (Def. Br. 29),
Defendants fail to indicate that these decisions emanate from jurisdictions that do not
adhere to the "majority rule" allowing recovery of "benefit of the bargain" damages for
fraud embraced by Utah courts. Dilworth v. Lauritzen, 424 P.2d 136, 137-38 (Ut 1967)
(Utah follows majority benefit of the bargain rule.) Thus, Defendants' argument that
Plaintiff Giusti is "attempting to import a 'benefit of the bargain' damages analysis" on

For example, Defendants cite Walker v. Micron Technology, Inc., 1998 WL 1769732,
an unreported decision of a Utah district court, as support for their argument that "Utah
courts have drawn a sharp distinction in the employment setting between contract and
fraud damages." (Def. Br. 28-29) However, in Walker, the plaintiffs were at-will
employees who were unable to rebut the presumption of at-will employment and hence
had no breach of contract claim. The district court held that the employees could not
bring a claim for fraudulent inducement to recover contract damages. The court also held
that the employees could not bring an action for fraudulent inducement because they had
no evidence to support such a claim. Thus, the distinction between contract and fraud
claims is no "sharper" in "the employment setting" as Defendants contend (D. Br. 28),
because in both types of claims a plaintiff may only legally recover the damages
appropriate to the claim and supported by the evidence. Id. at 1-8.
19

his fraud claim (Def. Br. 30), is unfounded. Utah has long adhered to the "majority rule"
recognizing "benefit of the bargain" damages in fraud cases. Accordingly, the district
court erred in limiting Plaintiff Giusti's fraudulent inducement claim and in denying him
"benefit of the bargain" damages. See, R.3666, 3707-10 (citing cases).21
Although Defendants argue that none of the cases cited by Plaintiff "involve an atwill employee's effort to recover forward looking damages by alleging fraud in the
inducement" (Def. Br. 30), the McConkey and Berger cases cited by Plaintiff involve just
such claims. 22 (PI. Br. 41; R.301-303) Defendants also do not dispute that "in those

Contrary to Defendants' argument (Def. Br. 30), Plaintiff cites Dilworth v. Lauritzen,
424 P.2d 136 (Utah 1967) and Conder v. A.L. Williams & Associates, Inc., 739 P.2d 634
(Utah App. 1987)) to support his argument that Utah follows the "benefit of the bargain"
rule of damages in fraud cases. (PI. Br. 42) Although Conder does not reveal whether the
plaintiff was an at-will employee, Conder was a fraudulent inducement of employment
case. Id. at 635. The Utah Court of Appeals reversed the district court's summary
judgment against Conder because the district court declined to award Conder benefit of
the bargain damages. Id. at 637. In doing so, the Court held that it could not conclude, as
a matter of law, that Conder had failed to establish some damages, where his affidavit
alleged that he was deprived of income he would have received during his employment at
MILICO had the fraudulent representations made to induce his employment been true. Id.
at 639-640. (Emphasis supplied) The fact that Conder had resigned from MILCO did not
prevent his recovery of forward looking "benefit of the bargain" type damages. Id. at 640.
See, Argument, R.3708-3710.
22

In Berger v. Security Pacific Info. Systems, Inc., 795 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Colo. App.
1990, the plaintiff at-will employee established that her employer fraudulently concealed
that the project she was hired to manage might be terminated. The court held that an
employer's right to terminate an at-will employee without cause does not protect the
employer from liability for fraud in inducing the employee to accept employment. Id. at
1384. Rejecting the employer's argument that its failure to disclose did not cause
Berger's financial losses because Berger was subsequently terminated, the court upheld
the award of damages to the plaintiff employee, including lost earnings from the time of
her termination until January 1, 1989, plus damages for losses on a house Berger
purchased in reliance on the employer's fraudulent representation plus punitive damages.
Id. at 1326.
20

jurisdictions that recognize the benefit of the bargain rule, the jury is permitted to infer
that the plaintiff would have continued to work a reasonable time had the terminated
opportunity been as successful as represented by the employer" and award benefit of the
bargain damages to cover the at-will employee's loss during this period. "Were such
damages not available, an employer could make fraudulent representations without any
accountability at all." McConkey v. Aon Corp, 804 A id 572, 587-590 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. (2002).23
Contrary to Defendants' assertion, Plaintiff Giusti did argue in the district court
that Defendants had the burden to prove their affirmative defense that Plaintiff Giusti had
not mitigated his damages. (R.3890-3891; PL Br. 46-47; Def. Br. 33) Thus, Plaintiff
asserts that the district court erred in ruling that Plaintiff had failed to establish any "out
of pocket" damages on his fraudulent inducement claim, because Plaintiff could not
recall the amount of the commissions he earned at Callware following his employment at
SWC. In making this finding, the district court improperly shifted the Defendants' burden
to show that Plaintiff Giusti had failed to mitigate his damages to Plaintiff Giusti, based
on its incorrect conclusion that "it is incumbent upon Mr. Giusti to compare the income

In their discussion of McConkey, (Def. Br. 32), Defendants fail to note that the
employer presented evidence that McConkey's employment, like that of Plaintiff Giusti,
was allegedly terminated due to poor performance. Id. at 588-589. Defendants' argument
that unlike the plaintiff in McConkey, Plaintiff Giusti "was not wrongly terminated at all"
(Def. Br. 32), simply argues a disputed issue of fact, which the district court did not reach
on Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claims, based upon its incorrect conclusion that
Plaintiff Giusti was an at-will employee whose employment could be terminated for any
reason or no reason under the SWC Agreement. See, Order, PL Br. Add. 9, at 1-2.
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he earned post Cambric with what he earned while there." See, PL Br. 46-47, discussing
Order, PL Br. Add. 9, R.3924. 24
Defendants' argument that the district court correctly denied Plaintiff Giusti's
claim for the $25,000 bonus he would have received at Cambric as "speculative", based
on Plaintiff Giusti's purported failure to present any contrary evidence in the district
court (Def. Br. 34), is incorrect. Plaintiff presented substantial evidence to show that he
would have received this bonus. (PL Br. 45, ^[4, R.3674) Defendants also mistakenly
argue that Plaintiff asserts that the district court failed to acknowledge the $800 monthly
car allowance (Def. Br. 35). In fact, Plaintiff Giusti argued the opposite, and observed
that the district court failed to consider this "out of pocket" damage in relation to
Plaintiffs claim for damages for being fraudulently induced to leave his employment at
Cambric, and thus erred in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff for purportedly
failing to show any damages on this claim. (PL Br. 45)
Although Defendants argue that Plaintiff Giusti stated that his salary at Cambric
was $125,000 (Def. Br. 33, citing R.3674, ^2), they do not dispute that Plaintiff submitted
additional evidence in opposing summary judgment, to show that his $125,000 starting
salary at Cambric was contractually due to increase to $135,000 on January 1, 2000. (PL
Br. 44-45; R.3888-3889) Thus, it is undisputed that the district court used an incorrect
24

The record in this case shows that Defendants subpoenaed Callware's records
concerning Plaintiff Giusti's employment on August 8, 2002 (R.900-905). Thus,
Defendants had the means to obtain information regarding the commissions Plaintiff
earned at Callware to present in mitigation of Plaintiff Giusti's damages at trial. See also,
John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 795 P.2d 678, 680-681 (Utah 1990) "It
is not a plaintiffs burden to produce the evidence on which any reduction of damages is
to be predicated." (Internal citations omitted)
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salary in computing Plaintiffs "out of pocket" losses (PL Br. 45). Defendants'
speculation that even correcting this error, "the aggregate of compensation from SWC
and Callware plainly exceeded that at Cambric" (Def. Br. 34), lacks any evidentiary basis
and fails to account for the benefit of the bargain damages Plaintiff incurred as the result
of being fraudulently induced to accept employment at SWC that his subsequent earnings
at Callware would be relevant to mitigate.
Alternatively, even if the district court was correct in ruling that Plaintiff Giusti
had no "out of pocket" losses, which Plaintiff disputes, the district court's error in
denying Plaintiff Giusti "benefit of the bargain" damages is all the more serious.
[W]hen the plaintiff has no out-of-pocket losses, the benefitof-the-bargain rule must apply, otherwise: the defrauding
defendant has successfully accomplished his fraud and is still
immune from an action in deceit.... This is not justice
between the parties. The admonitory function of the law
requires that the defendant not escape liability and justifies
allowing the plaintiff the benefit of the bargain.
See, Mike Finnin Ford v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 220 F. Supp.2d 970, 978-979
(N.D. Iowa 2001) (Internal citations omitted).
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should find that the district court erred
(1) in granting summary judgment for Defendants on Plaintiff Giusti's fraudulent
inducement claim (Count I); (2) in limiting Plaintiffs fraudulent inducement claim and
denying Plaintiff "benefit of the bargain" damages; (3) in denying Plaintiff "out of
pocket" damages, and find that (4) genuinely disputed issues of material fact remain for
trial on the damages Plaintiff incurred on his fraudulent inducement claims. Based upon
one or more of the foregoing findings, the Court should reverse the district court's order

23

granting Defendants summary judgment against Plaintiff Giusti on his fraudulent
inducement claim (Count I) and remand this claim to the district court for a trial on the
merits.
POINT IV

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF ON HIS CLAIMS FOR
INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE AGAINST HYDE AND
ERICKSON

Plaintiff Giusti contends that the district court erred in granting Hyde and
Erickson's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs claim for intentional interference
with Plaintiffs existing economic relations with SWC and his prospective economic
relations with SunGard (Count V), by improperly resolving genuinely disputed issues of
material fact concerning this claim against Plaintiff Giusti, to wit: (1) whether Hyde was
an employee of SWC or SunGard at the time Plaintiffs employment was terminated, and
(2) whether Hyde and Erickson terminated his employment for purely personal reasons to
avoid adverse consequences to their own employment. See, PL Br. 47-50, discussing
Order, PL Br. Add. 8, R.3735-3736.
Hyde and Erickson argue that "whether Hyde was an executive of SunGard does
not alter the fact that he was an employee of SWC" (Def. Br. 36) and refer to Hyde as
"SWC's Group CEO" in an unsupported attempt to paint Hyde as an SWC employee.
(Def. Br. 38) (Emphasis supplied) Conversely, Plaintiff Giusti presented substantial
record evidence demonstrating that Hyde was an employee, agent or representative of
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SunGard.

Even assuming Hyde's and/or Erickson's intentional interference is subject

to analysis under the "scope of employment" test announced in Birkner v. Salt Lake
County, 111 P.2d 1053, 1057 (Utah 1989), the district court still erred by incorrectly
concluding that "there is no evidence to establish that the termination of the plaintiff was
based solely on a personal motivation by either Erickson or Hyde." (Emphasis supplied.)
(Order, PL Br. Add. 8, R.3735-3736)
Although Hyde and Erickson cited evidence they claim shows that terminating
Plaintiffs employment "was in furtherance of SWC's interests" or sprang from "mixed
motives" (Def. Br. 39-42), Plaintiff Giusti presented substantial record evidence from
which a reasonable jury could find that Hyde's emails to Erickson complaining about
Plaintiffs performance were concocted as a pretext for terminating Plaintiffs
employment on false and malicious allegations of poor performance,26 and that Hyde and
Erickson were motivated to terminate Plaintiffs employment solely for the purely
personal reason of avoiding adverse consequences to their own employment.
Given the parties' highly disputed evidence on this issue, this case is factually
distinct from the cases cited by Defendants, including Christensen v. Swenson, 874 P.2d
125, 127 (1994) (Def. Br. 39) where "the employee's activity is so clearly within or
outside the scope of employment that reasonable minds cannot differ, or Lichtie v. U.S.
See, n. 5, supra, at 6, summarizing evidence Plaintiff presented in the district court
showing Hyde acted as an employee, agent or representative of SunGard in Utah,
26

See,ffi[30,33-41, PL Br. 21-24; 1ffll8-25, R.3680-3689; See also, f24A, R.3688
(showing termination of Giusti's employment falsely reported to Utah Department of
Employment Security as a "reduction in force.")
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Home Corp., 655 F. Supp. 1026 (D. Utah 1987), (Def. Br. 36-37,41-44), where the court
held that the only evidence showing that the employer acted from purely personal
motives in firing the plaintiff was a single statement taken "out of context." Lichtie, at
1028.27
"A district court is precluded from granting summary judgment i f the facts shown
by the evidence on a summary judgment motion support more than one plausible but
conflicting inference on a pivotal issue in the case ... particularly if the issue turns on
credibility or if the inferences depend upon subjective feelings or intent.'" Uintah Basin
Medical Center v. Hardy, 2008 UT 15, |19, 598 Utah Adv. Rep. 6. Because Hyde's and
Erickson's intent and motivation in terminating Plaintiffs employment present such
issues and the parties' conflicting evidence creates a jury question, the district court erred
in granting summary judgment against Plaintiff on his intentional interference claims
against Hyde and Erickson and the Court should reverse this decision and remand this
claim for a trial on the merits.
POINT V

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DENIED DEFENDANTS'
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES AND DEPOSITION COSTS

Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for attorney
fees pursuant to U.C.A. §78-27-56.5 or the SWC Agreement. (Def. Br. 44-47) However,
27

Although the district court found that the hiring and firing of employees was included
in the duties assigned to Hyde and Erickson (Order, PL Br. Add. 8, R.3736), the fact that
tortious conduct is performed either in a managerial capacity or within the scope of
apparent authority does not preclude a finding that the defendant acted solely for personal
motives. "[A]n employee's conduct is usually not in the scope of employment where the
employee's motivation is personal, even though some transaction of business or duty may
also occur." Jackson v. Righter, 891 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1995) Id. at 1391-92.
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Defendants did not move for attorney fees pursuant to §78-27-56.5 in the district court
and thus may not raise this claim for the first time on appeal. (R.4148-4154, 4356-4373)2
See, 438 Main Street v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72,1f51, 99 P.3d 801 (Issue must be
specifically raised in the trial court to preserve the issue for appeal.)
Defendants' argument for attorney fees and costs under §7.3 of the SWC
Agreement (Def. Br. 49-50) is also unfounded. Under §7.3, attorney fees and costs are
only available to the non-defaulting party "in the event either party defaults in any of the
terms or provisions of this Agreement." (Emphasis supplied) Plaintiff Giusti did not sue
Alternatively, in the event the Court finds Defendants did raise this argument in the
district court, §78-27-56.5 does not apply under the facts of this case. Unlike Bilanzich v.
Lonetti, 2007 UT 26, 163 P.3d 728 or Dejavue, Inc. v. U.S. Energy Corp., 1999 UT App
355, 993 P.2d 222 (Def. Br. 44-46), in which the contract fee provision limited recovery
of attorney fees to only one of the parties and resort to §78-27-56.5 was required "to
create a level playing field" for both parties, Bilanzich, at ^[18-19; Dejavue, at ^[18,
Plaintiff Giusti and SWC had an equal right to fees under §7.3 of the SWC Agreement,
which provided that attorney fees are available to the non-defaulting party "in the event
either party defaults in any of the terms or provisions of this Agreement." (Emphasis
supplied). {See, PL Br. Add. 6, R.427)
Bilanzich does not indicate that §78-27-56.5 is intended to create a right to attorney
fees different or greater than that provided for one of the parties under their contract.
Here, Plaintiff Giusti did not sue Defendants for defaulting under any of the terms or
provisions of the SWC Agreement and Defendants did not assert such a claim against
Plaintiff or defend against any such claim, as the district court correctly held. See, Order,
PI. Br. Add. 11. Thus, there is no "inconsistency" in the parties' rights to attorney fees
under §7.3 which would require resort to §78-27-56.5, as Defendants assert. (Def. Br. 47)
Moreover, under §78-27-56.5, the district court had discretion not to award fees and costs
to SWC. See, Bilanzich, ^[17. Because Defendants fail to marshal the evidence to show
that the district court abused its discretion in denying them attorney fees under the statute,
the district court's decision on this issue should be affirmed. Kraatz v. Heritage Imports,
2001 UT App 201,1J60, 71 P.3d 188 (Defendants' failure to marshal evidence to
challenge the district court's factual finding that attorney fees were reasonable precludes
review.)
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Defendants for defaulting under the terms or provisions of the SWC Agreement and
Defendants did not sue Plaintiff on such a claim. Although Defendants also seek fees and
costs under §7.3 on the ground that "every one of Plaintiff s claims involve his
employment relationship" (D. Br. 47, n.14, 50), §7.3 does not provide attorney fees and
costs for this broad spectrum of claims, but only for claims involving a default under the
terms and provisions of the SWC Agreement.
Defendants' motion for attorney fees and costs pursuant to the SWC Agreement
should also be denied on the additional grounds Plaintiff Giusti briefed and argued in the
district court, incorporated by reference herein, namely that (1) SWC's unilateral
termination of the SWC Agreement on May 12, 2000, terminated all provisions of the
Agreement, including the attorney fee and cost provision in §7.3; (2) the SWC
Agreement was fraudulently induced and is thus unenforceable; (3) Hyde and Erickson
were not parties to the SWC Agreement and cannot recover any fees or costs under §7.3
which limits such recovery to a "non-defaulting" party; (4) SWC cannot show that it
expended any attorney fees or costs to remedy a claim for a "default" under the terms of
the SWC Agreement; (5) certain litigation expenses claimed as "costs" by Defendants are
not recoverable under U.R.Civ.P.54(d)(2); (6) Defendants' motions for attorney fees and
deposition costs are insufficiently supported; (7) Defendants fail to allocate services for
which there was no entitlement to fees and costs, and (8) certain of the fees and costs
29

See, Maynard v. Wharton, 912 P.2d 446, 452 (UT App. 1996) (Contract provision for
fees in the event of a "default" did not contemplate an award of attorney fees for seller
just because buyers sued on other claims); See also, Foote v. Clarke, 962 P.2d 52, 56
(Utah 1998) (Where contract does not provide for attorney fees, fees cannot be recovered
on claim regardless of which party prevailed.)
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claimed are prima facie unreasonable because they are unnecessary, duplicative,
excessive, insufficiently supported and/or incorrectly accounted. (R.4184-4348; 43834387)
Defendants also argue that the district court erred in denying depositions costs
under U.R.Civ.P.54(d), based on a finding that such costs were "unnecessary." (Def. Br.
48-49). See also, Order, PI. Br. Add. 15. This finding is also reviewed under an "abuse of
discretion" standard requiring Defendants to marshal the evidence in support of the
district court's decision. Instead, Defendants "merely reargue the factual evidence [they]
presented in the trial court and ask[] this court to reconsider the weight and strength of
that evidence." Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 389, ^[28, 80 P.3d 553.
Because Defendants fail to marshal the evidence supporting the district court's
decision denying Defendants deposition costs as "unnecessary," the Court must assume
that the district court's finding was correct. Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Comtrol, Inc.,
2007 UT App 407,1ffl4l-43,175 P.3d 572 (Discussing duty to marshal under "abuse of
discretion" standard); Eggett v. Wasatch Energy Corp., 2004 UT 28,1J36-38,
94 P.3d 193 (Failure to marshal evidence to challenge factual finding that plaintiffs
attorney properly apportioned recoverable attorney fees precludes review.)
POINT VI

DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS THIS APPEAL AS
UNTIMELY IS UNFOUNDED AND SHOULD BE DENIED

Based upon the points and authorities previously submitted in Plaintiff's
Memorandum In Opposition To Defendantsy Motion For Summary Disposition To
Dismiss Plaintiffs Appeal As Untimely, filed September 7, 2007, the Court should rule
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that it has jurisdiction of this appeal. Plaintiff Giusti's appeal should not be dismissed as
untimely because Plaintiffs counsel relied on Defendants' counsel's representation that
Defendants would prepare a proposed Judgment, where Defendants' counsel later
decided not to prepare a proposed Judgment, and Plaintiffs counsel followed the district
court's instruction to prepare and submit a final Judgment which was duly entered on
July 10, 2007 and from which Plaintiff Giusti timely filed his Notice of Appeal on
August 6, 2007. See, PL Br. Add. 12-14.
CONCLUSION
For all of the reasons set forth herein, Plaintiff Giusti respectfully requests that the
Court reverse the district court's orders dismissing SunGard for lack of personal
jurisdiction, reverse the district court's orders granting summary judgment on the claims
contained in Counts I through V of Plaintiff s First Amended Complaint and dismissing
this case, affirm the district court's orders denying Defendants' motion for attorney fees
and costs and deny the Defendants' request for costs incurred in this appeal.
DATED this 16th day of April, 2008.
THE LAW FIRM OF KATHRYN COLLARD, LC

/KATHRYN
fiCLLAT©--^"/
Attorney for Plaintiff Appellant—-'
And Cross Appellee
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VIA HAND DELIVERY
Lois A. Baar
Cecilia M. Romero
HOLLAND & HART
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031
VIA FEDERAL EXPRESS
Laurence S. Shtasel
BLANK ROME LLP
One Logan Square
Philadelphia, PA 19103
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LOIS A. BAAR (3761)
ELLEN KITZMJLLER (7566)
JANOVE BAAR ASSOCIATES, L.C.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1112
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 530-0404
Facsimile: (801) 530-0428
LAURENCE S. SHTASEL
BLANK ROME LLP
One Logan Square
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
(215) 569-5500
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STEPHEN A. GIUSTI,
Plaintiff,
vs.
STERLING WENTWORTH
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; JOHN
HYDE and PAUL ERICKSON,
Defendants.
STERLING WENTWORTH
CORPORATION, a Utah Corporation,
Counterclaimant,
vs.
STEPHEN A. GIUSTI,
Counterclaim Defendant.

:
:
:
:

DEFENDANTS'
SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES
PURSUANT TO THE
COURT'S JULY 28,
2003 ORDER

•

Civil No. 000905359

:

Judge L.A. Dever

:
:
:

defamatory statement regarding Plaintiff or otherwise interfere with his employment
relationship with any third party.
Pursuant toNhe Court's July 28, 2000 Order requiring Defendants to supplement
their response to PlaintuKs request for documents by providing documents referring to
Plaintiff, to the extent not alr^dv produced, Defendants identify Bates ## 11305 through
11552, enclosed herewith.

\,

Pursuant to the Court's July 28, Z&Q0 Order requiring Defendants to supplement
their response to Plaintiffs request for documenttsby providing contracts entered into after
Plaintiff was hired and before Plaintiffs termination/to the extent not already produced,
Defendants identify Bates ## CON1207 through CON 1380/k^losed herewith.
Pursuant to the Court's July 28, 2000 Order requiring Defendants to supplement
their response to Plaintiffs request for documents by providing document reflecting income
from SWC's sales and expenses associated with those sales, for the period jWiary 1, 1997
through December 31, 2000, to the extent not already produced, Defendants identify Bates
## CON1193 through CON1205 and CON1381 through CON1401, enclosed herewith
Pursuant to the Court's July 28, 2000 Order requiring Defendants to supplement
their response to Plaintiffs request for documents by providing documents describing
personnel policies, commissions and bonus plans, and stock options plans for which Plaintiff
was eligible, to the extent not already produced, Defendants identify Bates ## 11553 through
11623, enclosed herewith.
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DATED this (7 I day of August, 2003.

Lois A. Baar
Ellen Kitzmiller
JANOVE BAAR ASSOCIATES, L.C.
Laurence S. Shtasel
BLANK ROME LLP
Attorneys for Defendants
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I hereby certify that on this £j. day of August, 2003, I caused to be handdelivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' SUPPLEMENTAL
RESPONSES PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S JULY 28,2003 ORDER to:
Kathryn Collard, Esq.
The Law Firm of Kathryn Collard, L.C.
9 Exchange Place, Suite 1111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

'ft! Mk

33

V

Tempest

REPORTING
iREPORTING
i Tin-: Tnrpp

ORIGINAL
,'IJIJICIAL

LLJTRLCT

COURT

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

-0STEFHEN A GIU8TI,
Plaintiff,

Civil Mo. 000905359
(Judge Glen Iwasaki)

-vSUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS, INC.,
a Delaware corporation;
SUNGARD INVESTMENT SYSTEMS iNC
a Delaware corporation,
STERLING WENTWORTH CORPORATION
a Utah corporation; JOHN HYDE
and PAUL ERICKSON,

Deposition of:
PATRICIA BLACK

Defendant.

-OPlace:

LAW OFFICES OF
KATHRYN COLLARD
9 Exchange Place, #1111
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Date:

December 9, 2 0 03
1:32 p.m.

Reporter:

Vickie Larsen, CSR/RPR

-O-

Tempest Reporting, Inc.
:-.H 1-521-5222 / Fax 801-521-5244
i «-|. otlicc Box 3474 / Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

1

perhaps.

MR. SHTASEL:

Objection.

THE WITNESS:

When this came out,

I don't recall at the time, no.

Q.

BY MS. COLLARD:

Okay.

Well, what

I'm

really trying to find out is, during the time that you
were the personnel manager at Sterling

Wentworth

Corporation, did employees, as a matter of course,
think that they were bound by these policies?
MR. SHTASEL:

Objection.

"These

policies" meaning Exhibit 1?
MS. COLLARD:

Yes.

MR. SHTASEL:

She supposed to say what?

MS. COLLARD:

Well, did she tell

employees, look, here are these policies -MR. SHTASEL:

That's a different

question.
Q.

BY MS. COLLARD:

Okay.

Did you tell

employees that they were bound by these policies
are in Exhibit 1?

that

These apply to you and you better

follow them?
A.

Yes.

Q.

Okay.

A.

Okay.

Q.

Okay.

That's what I'm trying to find

out.

Good.

TEMPEST REPORTING,
(801)
521-5222

INC.

O n P a g e ] 1 6 0 7 y • :)I i ' ] ] i I :) 1: :i ::
•*•u ~ " D e f i n i 1 1 o n s "

E;

t h e r e i ] nde r

sec t i o n t h e f i r s t p a r a g r a p h i t s a y s

""Company1
Systems,

means SunGard

a Delaware

Data

corporation

(referred to as 'SunGard' ) ai id a 11
subsidiaries that are more than
owned or contro.1 1 ed,

!JUI»

directly or

:i :ec t J > , 1: •} Sui iGa r d . "
D o y o u see that?
A.
. Q.
!:!: :i i i e s

I J1 I - 1 11 11: i, i;r e s .
A n d t h e n d o w n t h r e e m o r e p a r a g r a p h s it
e iti/p 3 - :> y B e , a r i d

:i t s a;; * s 11: ' :

"Meai is an employee of the company"
as defined above -- ' "including all
oiiicers and inc1ud in q ^1

1

directors

who are .- "] so employees oi Liic
Company."
A.

Okay.

Q.

A] ]

~-'"* /;-*:: • * '.

J: :
i

g 1: 11

S : :i :i :i \,T < :

I L I 11 i d e

r s t a i I I 11: i a !:: a s

" h i s p o J icy was provi ded to
e r .1 :i i I :j W e • i I I: \ J o r 11: I C o r p o r a 1: :i :> n a f t e r

u e r g ^ a wi*.. S u n G a r d

Data Systems,

that y o u w e r e an

eirr ^ ~ y t;e oi ouiibdia D a t a S y s 1:ems ?
A.

Yes.
MR#

SHTASEL:

objection.

TEMPEST REPORTING,
(801)
521-5222

INC.

1

Q.

BY MS. COLLARD:

Okay.

And did you

2

understand that all of the employees of Sterling

3

Wentworth Corporation were also -- were employees of

4

SunGard Data

Systems?

a 5

MR. SHTASEL:

Objection.

6

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

7

Q.

BY MS. COLLARD:

Okay.

When you told

8

Mr. Giusti that he would need to sign the Sterling

9

Wentworth employment agreement in order for you to

910

start processing his benefits

11
12

MR. SHTASEL:
testified.

13

—

That wasn't what she

That's what you testified.
MS. COLLARD:

Wasn't that what you told

2615

MR. SHTASEL:

No.

16

THE WITNESS:

Before he could work there

14

17
18
19

him?

as an employee.
Q.

BY MS. COLLARD:

Before he could work

there as an employee?

3220

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Okay.

22

A.

It's a -- it's a conflict of interest.

What did you mean by that?

23

It's an employment agreement -- well basically it's --

24

employees can't just work there if they haven't

:5625

this agreement that they're —

signed

that they -- along with

TEMPEST REPORTING,
(801)
521-5222

INC.
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Business Conduct Poli< v
Conflict of Interest Policy
Insider Trading and Disclosure Policy

SUNGARD

SUNGARD® DATA SYSTEMS INC.
BUSINESS CONDUCT POLICY
I. INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL GUIDELINES
A business enterprise usually is thought of in economic terms, but it is more realistically, and
more importantly, an organization of people. As such, a business has ethical responsibilities
as well as economic responsibilities. It must understand and uphold laws, customs (if within
the law) and human values. SunGard Data Systems Inc. has adopted this Business Conduct
Policy in order to provide all employees of SunGard and its subsidiaries w i t h clear guidelines
respecting their conduct as representatives of the Company.
Ethical behavior is a matter of conviction and intent as well as a matter of law. Accordingly,
our Policy starts w i t h these general guidelines:
• There is no conflict between attention to profits and attention to ethics. Our most
valuable asset, both as individuals and as a Company, is our reputation. We best
serve our customers, our stockholders and ourselves by adhering to the highest
standards of ethical behavior and by maintaining an environment that is fair, open
and honest.
•

A fundamental tenet of this Policy is openness. Every transaction w e engage in must
be correctly recorded. We should have no fear of inspection.

•

Integrity is not a relative quality and does not vary by location or situation. If we are
steadfast in this belief, then most ethical questions will not be difficult to resolve.

•

It is not possible to itemize the correct ethical behavior for every conceivable
situation. Ultimately, w e must rely on our o w n good judgment. Whenever we are
faced with a hard decision, w e must seek counsel from our friends, associates and
management.

•

While acting lawfully does not guarantee that one acts ethically, complying w i t h the
- law is a fundamental prerequisite of ethical behavior/ In addition, answers to some
questions of ethical behavior depend upon societal values and customs that evolve
over time. Accordingly, w e will periodically review this Policy and issue revisions to
reflect changes in laws and in societal values and customs.

Some of the subjects covered in this Policy are addressed in more detail in other Policies
issued by the Company t h a t also must be carefully observed by all employees. In particular:
•

"Conflict of Interest" is addressed in detail in the Company's Conflict of Interest
Policy.

•

"Confidentiality and Insider Trading" is addressed in detail in the Company's
Trading and Disclosure Policy.
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BUSINfcSSCOND U CT" PO LI C Y

SunGard's Audit Committee, which consists of members of SunGard's Board of Directors, is
the final authority for resolving all questions and issues concerning this Policy.
11. COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW
General Compliance:
We strive to operate within the letter and spirit of all laws that
businesses wherever located. Each of us cannot, however, be a
aspect of our business. We recognize that, in many eases, laws
difficult to interpret. To assist us, .the Company will ei isure that we
legal advice wherever and whenever necessary.

are applicable to our
legal expert on every
can be confusing and
have access to expert

What we must do is be continually cognizant of the need to research and monitor all
relevant legal requirements. To do so, w e must seek appropriate legal advice to assure that
we are in compliance w i t h this Policy and are observing all prevailing laws, rules and
regulations.
We consider compliance w i t h applicable laws so vitally ii t iportai it that neither claims of
ignorance nor claims of good intentions will be accepted as excuses for violations,

The use of Company funds or assets for any illegal or unethical purpose is strictly prohibited.
The financial affairs of the Company will be conducted in strict compliance with these
guidelines:
/

No undisclosed or unrecorded fund or asset will be established or maintained by or
for the Company for any purpose.
•

No false or artificial entry will be made on the Company's books or records for any
purpose.

•

No payment will be made or received by the Company with the understanding that it
will or might be used for something other than its stated purpose.

Entertainment, Gifts, Favors and Gratuities:
Ei rtertainment, gifts, favors and gratuities, whether
employees, must comply strictly w i t h these guidelines:
• They cannot be intended, or appear to be i
or to influence the judgment of the recipient.

offei eel

ty

::: i

extended

t:

01 n

• They must be of such limited value that they cannot have, or appear to have, any
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BUSINESS CONDUCT POLICY

meaningful impact on the personal financial situation of the recipient or the terms of
any transaction engaged in by the Company.
• They must be of such nature that full public disclosure would not be embarrassing to
the giver, the recipient or the Company.
•

Subject to the above guidelines, they are permitted if given to or received from
customers, prospects and suppliers, provided that (1) they are not cash or the
equivalent of cash, and (2) they are reasonable and customary within the context of
ethical business practices, and (3) if given by SunGard employees, they are recorded
on the Company's financial records.

• Subject to the above guidelines, they are permitted if given or offered by SunGard
employees to minor public officials for the performance of their public duties, in those
locations in foreign countries (never in the United States) where it is customary to do
so and where a fully legitimate business transaction otherwise might be impeded,
provided that they are recorded on the Company's financial records.
• All other entertainment, gifts, favors and gratuities are prohibited, particularly those
that might appear to be intended to influence public employees in the United States
to perform acts that are contrary to the letter or spirit of the laws governing their
official functions.
Conflict of Interest:
A conflict of interest is a situation in which an employee might not be able to act with
complete objectivity in promoting the Company's best interests. We must seek to avoid
conflicts of interest, but w e also must recognize that they will inevitably arise from time to
time. When a conflict of interest does occur, the employee whose objectivity might be
affected should abstain from acting on the situation w i t h o u t full disclosure and the
participation of other employees for w h o m the situation does not involve a conflict of
interest.
In an effort to avoid conflicts of interest, each employee, and each member of his or her
immediate family, is expected to avoid any investment or involvement, especially those with
competitors, customers and suppliers, that might in any way interfere, or appear to interfere,
with his or her ability to act objectively on behalf of the Company.
Sometimes conflicts of interest will develop accidently or unexpectedly. If this happens,
then report the matter directly to your supervisor or to SunGard's General Counsel or Chief
Financial Officer. Usually these situations can be easily resolved if they are handled quickly
and openly.
This is just a summary of the Company's policy regarding conflicts of interest.
detailed statement is contained in the Company's Conflict of Interest Policy.

A more
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Confidentiality and Insider Trading:
All confidential, proprietary and otherwise sensitive infoi mation obtained by any SunGard
employee during the course of, or as a result of, his or her employment w i t h the Company
must be held in strict confidence. This applies not only to information about the Company
and its products and businesses, but also to information about customers, prospects,
suppliers, employees and the former employers of employees.
j 0 p r o t e c t this type of information, w e must not discuss it w i t h anyone outside the
Company, except, when applicable, w i t h the customer, prospect or supplier w h o furnished
the information. Even inside the Company, w e must limit disclosure to those whose jobs
require them, to have the information.
In addition to oi 11 cli i t y to protect" against unauthorized disclosures of confidential
information, we also have a duty not to use any of this information for personal gain or any
other improper purpose.
For example, securities laws prohibit the use of confidential
information for purposes of buying or selling SunGard securities by any employee or by
anyone to whom any employee discloses confidential information. We also are prohibited
from trading in securities of any public company in \ \ x 1 nicl \ Si inGarci has indicated a
prospective interest.
A more detailed statement of the Company f s policies regarding insider trading,
confidentiality and related matters is contained in the Company's Insider Trading and
Disclosure Policy.

Many antitrust laws have been adopted by the United States at id by other countries or
groups of countries such as the members of the European Economic Community. Because
antitrust laws are among the most complex and difficult laws to understand, we must seek
expert legal advice whenever we face potential antitrust issues. These issues may arise in a
variety of ways.
To recognize them, we should always keep in mind these general
guidelines:
•

An agreement or understanding w i t h a competitor that restricts competition not only
is bad business practice, but also may be illegal. This may apply to agreements with
respect to pricing, the terms or conditions of sale, the division of markets by territory
or type of customer, and related matters.

•

Any contact w i t h a competitor can create the appearance of an antiti i ist la\ u violatic i i
and must be carefully handled w i t h this in mind.

•

An agreement or understanding that involves exclusive dealing, tie-in sales,
differences in price or other terms as between customers, quantity discounts or other
restrictive arrangements w i t h customers or suppliers may be illegal and should not be
entered into without the approval of legal counsel.

ADOPTED: 02/12/91
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Reciprocal dealing arrangements must be avoided. We will sell Company products
and services on the basis of their value to our customers, not by using our
purchasing power as a real or implied threat. We will not require our suppliers to buy
from SunGard, nor will w e agree to purchase goods or services from our customers
under any circumstances that amount to or suggest reciprocal dealing.
Political Contributions:
Even though legal in some places, the use of Company funds for contributions (direct or
indirect) to any political candidate or party, or to any other organization that might use the
contributions for the benefit of a political candidate or party, are strictly prohibited, unless
approved in advance by SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit
Committee Chairman. Individual employees, of course, are free to participate in the political
process in whatever manner they like, including contributions of personal funds.
III.

RELATIONSHIPS

Relations with Employees:
We affirm the principle of equal employment opportunity without regard to race, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status, handicap, disability, sexual orientation, citizenship
status, status as a Vietnam-era or other veteran, or personal affiliation, and w e will uphold
this principle in all locations as permitted by the law.
We are committed to providing a safe and healthy working environment, and w e will
maintain and improve our facilities, equipment and methods to that end.
Our intention is to compensate employees in relation to their responsibilities and
performance and in accordance w i t h the prevailing standards of the communities and
markets in which they work.
We endeavor to deal fairly and equitably with our employees. To the fullest extent possible,
we will timely inform employees about Company policies and plans that may affect them.
We encourage feedback from employees about their work and about the Company.
Relations with Customers:
SunGard prospers to the degree-and only to the degree-that w e serve our customers
honestly and competently. Our competitive appeal must be based upon the quality of our
products and services, the prices w e charge for them, the integrity of our sales and
marketing efforts, and the reliability of our customer support. We will give all customers,
big and little, fair and equal treatment.
We will be responsive and courteous to all
customers. We will never forget that, without customers, w e would not have jobs.
Relations with Suppliers:
ADOPTED: 02/12/91
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Our choice' of suppliers will be based solely upon the quality, price and service offered,
giving due consideration, when applicable, to the need for multiple sources of supply. We
will conduct open and frank business dealings w i t h our suppliers and strive to develop
mutually advantageous relationships but not on the basis of reciprocity. We may purchase
goods and services from our customers when the combination of quality, price and service is
competitive with that of other suppliers.
Relations with

Stockholders:

Our stockholders have entrusted us with their invested dollars. Our responsibility to them is
to do our very best to keep our stockholders' equity secure and to produce a fair return on
that equity. Our intention is to manage our businesses so as to keep the Company growing
and prospering. Whenever possible, we will not sacrifice our long-term goals to short-term
profits. In each of our transactions, we will endeavor to promote the interests of our
stockholders.
Relations with the Public:
We recognize that a corporation has more than an economic existence. SunGard is a part of
many communities and must behave as a good citizen wherever it* lives. We live in a world
that sometimes looks w i t h suspicion upon big business, its motives and its behavior.
SunGard will conduct itself so as to reflect well upon the business community as a whole.
We also will conduct our business w i t h due concern for our physical environment. We will
strive to conserve energy and natural resources.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND ENFORCEMENT
To assure that our commitment to ethical business conduct is honored, w e must adopt
methods for implementing and enforcing this Policy. In keeping w i t h the SunGard tradition
of eschewing corporate bureaucracy, we will endeavor to limit these procedures to the
barest minimum necessary to do the job. While the Company has neither the desire nor
intention of over-complicating our lives with unnecessary procedures, SunGard does want it
clearly understood that adherence to this Policy carries the highest priority within the
Company.
Like the Policy itself, these follow-through steps will be subject to revision as we gain
experience with them.
Judgment Calls:
The most fundamental method for implementing this Policy is to provide a mechanism to
help us handle difficult judgment decisions-those "grey areas" where it can be hard to
discern right from w r o n g . None of us should avoid tackling ethical questions, but none of us
should feel isolated in doing so. When the answer is not clear, seek counsel. The SunGard
method is simple: ask the person you report to or ask SunGard's General Counsel, Chief
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Financial Officer or any other corporate officer.
All managers and corporate officers must maintain an "open door" policy w i t h regard to
questions of ethics. They should make themselves readily available to all employees for this
purpose. Employees are reminded that the best time to raise a question of ethical behavior
is before the fact, not after the fact. Never hesitate to talk to supervisors about a question
as to proper business conduct, even if it does not appear to be important at the time.
Investigations

and Final Decisions:

Managers and corporate officers will investigate any suspicion that unethical or illegal
activities are taking place, or call upon SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or
Audit Committee Chairman for assistance.
The Company's independent public accountants will immediately report to SunGard's Audit
Committee Chairman any violations or suspected violations of this Policy that come to their
attention as a result of conducting the Company's annual audit.
Each employee must fully cooperate to assure that violations or potential violations of this
Policy are called to the attention of those in the Company who should be informed and to
assure that any necessary investigations are quickly and effectively carried out.
All reports and investigations must be handled confidentially. While most investigations will
be conducted on an informal basis, those involved must be impartial and objective', and basic
principles of "due process" must be observed. No employee should ever be adjudged to
have behaved unethically before he or she has had a reasonable opportunity to explain the
circumstances and confront the evidence.
Annual Review and Distribution:
Once each year, each corporate officer, and the senior operating officer, senior financial
officer and senior human resources officer of each business unit, will review this Policy and
the Company's Conflict of Interest Policy and Insider Trading and Disclosure Policy with their
direct reports and instruct them to do the same. Once each year, the senior financial officer
or the senior human resources officer of each business unit will distribute the most recent
revisions of this Policy and the Company's Conflict of Interest Policy and Insider Trading and
Disclosure Policy to all employees. In addition, this Policy and the Company's Conflict of
Interest Policy and Insider Trading and Disclosure Policy will be given t o and reviewed with
all new hires.
Once each year, each director, each corporate officer, and the senior operating officer,
senior financial officer and senior human resources officer of each business unit, will sign a
letter addressed to the Audit Committee stating that within the past year:
•

They have complied w i t h the annual review and distribution requirements of this
Policy (as stated in the preceding paragraph).
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• They have investigated any cases of suspicious conduct or referred them to
SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit Committee Chairman.
• They have reported any violations of this Policy or of the Company's Conflict of
Interest Policy or Insider Trading and Disclosure Policy to SunGard's General Counsel,
Chief Financial Officer or Audit Committee Chairman.
Sanctions:
Failure to comply with this Policy could result in very serious consequences both to the
individual involved and to the Company. Any employee who violates this Policy will be
subject to appropriate disciplinary and remedial sanctions. In serious cases, this may include
immediate discharge and possible legal action by the Company.

/3
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Purposes:
We all have a duty of loyalty to the Company to further its goals and to work on behalf of
its best interests. In establishing and achieving its goals, the Company intends not only to
comply with legal requirements, but also to conduct its business affairs w i t h the highest
level of integrity.
The purposes of this Policy are to explain the Company's policies regarding conflicts of
interest and to establish procedures for reporting, reviewing and resolving situations that
involve actual or apparent conflicts of interest. A primary goal of this Policy is to prevent
the improper use of Company positions or information for personal gain.
SunGard's Audit Committee, which consists of members of SunGard's Board of Directors, is
the final authority for resolving all questions and issues concerning this Policy.
Definitions:
"Company" means SunGard Data Systems Inc., a Delaware corporation (referred to
as "SunGard"), and all subsidiaries that are more-than-50% owned or controlled,
directly or indirectly, by SunGard.
"Director" means any member of the Board of Directors of SunGard.
"Officer" means any person w h o is considered an executive officer of SunGard for
federal securities law purposes. Generally, this includes the chief executive officer of
SunGard and all officers of SunGard and its subsidiaries w h o report directly to the
chief executive officer of SunGard.
"Employee" means any employee of the Company including all officers and including
all directors w h o are also employees of the Company.
"Management employee" means any officer, or any employee of any subsidiary of
SunGard who holds the title of Assistant Vice President or any higher title of that
subsidiary, or any other management level employee of any subsidiary of SunGard.
"Conflict-of-interest situation" means any decision, action or other situation that
involves or will involve an actual conflict, or the appearance of a conflict, between
the Company's interests and the financial or other personal interests of any director
or employee, or any member of his or her immediate family, or any company or firm
with which a director or employee or any member of his or her immediate family is
associated. A conflict-of-interest situation exists even if there is ho reason t o believe
that the individual involved would resolve the situation to his or her o w n personal
advantage.
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The following are not considered conflict-of-interest situations: the payment of
compensation and provision of benefits by the Company to its employees; the
ownership by directors and employees of SunGard common stock, options to
purchase common stock or other securities; and the regular engagement by a nonemployee director in an occupation or employment that involves acquisition,
investment, finance or related activities.
Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest:
In an effort to avoid conflict-of-interest situations, each director and employee, and each
member of his or her immediate family, is expected to avoid any investment or involvement,
especially those w i t h competitors, customers and suppliers, that might in any way cause or
appear to cause a conflict-of-interest situation.
No management employee will engage in any Outside employment, whether as an employee,
officer, director, partner, trustee or proprietor, with any company or firm, without first
obtaining the approval of SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit
Committee Chairman. Approval will be given if the outside employment will not interfere
with the management employee's performance of his or her regular duties for the Company
and will not create or appear to create a conflict-of-interest situation. This applies only to
outside employment w i t h business enterprises and not to associations with charitable,
religious, civic, educational or other non-profit organizations.
Reporting of Conflicts of Interest:
Whenever a director or employee becomes aware of a conflict-of-interest situation, whether
it involves himself or herself or another, he or she will promptly and fully report all relevant
facts to his or her supervisor or to SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or
Audit Committee Chairman.
If the conflict-of-interest situation involves a director or officer, or if it is considered material
to the Company by SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit Committee
Chairman, then the person reporting the conflict-of-interest situation must confirm his or her
report in writing, and the written report will be sent to the members of SunGard's Audit
Committee.
Conflict of Interest Disqualification:
No director or employee will participate on behalf of the Company, through decision,
approval or otherwise, in the resolution of any conflict-of-interest situation involving the
financial or other personal interests of that director or employee, any member of his or her
immediate family, or any company or firm with which that director or employee or any
member of his or her immediate family is associated.

ADOPTED: 02/07/89

LATEST REVISION: 05/14/99

PAGE 2 OF 3

11608

SUNGARD DATA SYSTEMS INC.

Review of Conflict-of-interest

CONFUCT OF INTEREST POLICY

Situations:

If a conflict-of-interest situation involves a director or officer, or if it is considered material to
the Company by SunGard's General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit Committee
Chairman, then the conflict-of-interest situation will be reviewed by SunGard's Audit
Committee at its next regularly scheduled meeting or, when the Audit Committee Chairman
deems it necessary or desirable, at a special meeting called for that purpose. At any such
meeting, any interested member of the Audit Committee may be counted in determining the
existence of a quorum.
SunGardfs Audit Committee will determine whether an actual or potential conflict of interest
exists or will exist and, if so, whether the situation is actually or potentially detrimental to
the Company's interests and whether corrective or preemptive action should be taken. The
existence of a conflict of interest will not, by itself, require a determination that corrective or
preemptive action should be taken.
In all other cases, conflict-of-interest situations will be reviewed and resolved by SunGard's
General Counsel, Chief Financial Officer or Audit Committee Chairman.
Sanctions:
Failure to comply with this Policy could result in very serious consequences both to the
individual involved and to the Company. Any employee who violates this Policy will be
subject to appropriate disciplinary and remedial sanctions. In serious cases, this may include
immediate discharge and possible legal action by the Company.
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